We study the problem of inheritance and capital income optimal taxation in an economy with migration. In particular, we analyze the role played by the weights attached to the individual utility functions in the social welfare function. If these weights correspond to the demographic weights, the disconnection brought in by migration is the underlying reason for non zero optimal tax rates.
Introduction
The issue of inheritance taxation is very similar to that of capital income taxation, once they are analyzed within the optimal taxation framework: should one tax own future consumption and estate (i.e. perspective heirs' consumption) more than own present consumption?
As for capital income taxation, starting from the seminal works by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) , the issue of dynamic optimal capital income taxation has been analyzed by a number of researchers. In particular, Judd (1999) has shown that the zero tax rate result stems from the fact that a tax on capital income is equivalent to a tax on future consumption: thus, capital income should not be taxed if the elasticity of consumption is constant over time. However, while in infinitely lived representative agent (ILRA) models 1 this condition is necessarily satisfied in the long run, along the transition path, instead, it holds only if the utility function is assumed to be (weakly) separable in consumption and leisure and homothetic in consumption. Another source of taxation can derive from the presence of externalities, which gives room to nonzero taxation as a Pigouvian correction device 2 . Abandoning the standard ILRA framework in favour of Overlapping Generation models with life cycle (OLG-LC) 3 has delivered another important case of nonzero capital income taxation. This outcome can be understood by reckoning that in such a setup optimal consumption and labor (or, more precisely, the general equilibrium elasticity of consumption) are generally not constant over life and even at the steady state, due to life-cycle behavior.
A similar reasoning can be applied to estate taxation. Note that this corresponds to a differential treatment of savings for own future consumption, on the one hand, and of savings for bequest, on the other hand. Thus, the first aspect to note is that the optimality of a nonzero tax on capital income does not necessarily imply the optimality of a nonzero tax on estates. In fact the latter can be justified on arguments analogous to those presented above: a nonzero estate tax could stem either from the violation of (weak) separability between "expenditure" on estate and (previous period) leisure or from a difference between the donor's and the donee's general equilibrium elasticities of consumption, according to the framework being analyzed. Another reason for levying a tax on inheritance could be correcting for an externality. Atkinson (1971) and Stiglitz (1987) consider the positive externality deriving from the fact that transfers benefit those who receive them. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) , Imbens et al. (1999) , Joulfaian et al. (1994) consider instead the negative externality deriving, in the presence of an income tax, from a fall in heirs' labor efforts. In the field of estate and transfers in general, the analysis of the motives for giving is another important aspect. In fact, different motives are associated to different forms of utility functions and, as a consequence, to different policy effects. Altruism, joy of giving, exchange related motives, accidental bequests have been widely studied in the literature (see Davies, 1996; Masson and Pestieau, 1997; Stark, 1999; Kaplow, 2001 ).
In this paper we consider altruism motivated bequests. However, we introduce an element that is not considered in the existing models, i.e. the presence of migration. Moreover, we allow for a disconnection in the economy, in that we assume altruism to be limited to own descendants 4 . This element turns out to be a relevant determinant of taxation once it is embedded in the social welfare function, and precisely in the sense that the policymaker takes into account the demographic evolution of the population. In fact, the zero capital income and inheritance tax result applies only if the disconnection of the economy is disregarded. We identify instead a number of ways in which the demographic evolution of the population can be accounted for within the social welfare function via appropriate intergenerational weights, leading to different combinations of the inheritance and capital income tax rates, with at least one of them being nonzero.
The work proceeds as follows: in section 2 we present the model and derive the equilibrium conditions for the decentralized economy. Next, we characterize the Ramsey problem by adopting the primal approach. Finally, we present the results by focusing on the new ones. Concluding remarks and a technical appendix will end the work.
The model
We consider a neoclassical-production-closed economy in which there is a large number of agents and firms.
Private agents, who are endowed with identical preferences, differ as for their date of entry into the economy, s; natives are supposed to have entered the economy at time s = 0, when also the economy starts, while migrants start entering at time s = 1; agents live two periods: in the first period they receive an inheritance from their parents, work and consume; in the second period, they consume, give birth to (1 + n) children and leave them a bequest upon dying; at the same time, in each period migrants enter the economy at a given rate α, proportional to the number of young individuals populating the economy: as a consequence, the population growth rate is equal to (1 + π) = (1 + n)(1 + α) .
We normalize the size of the population at time 0 to unity, so that the whole population at time t has cardinality:
and the size of each dynasty (started off with the entry of the founder) is:
Moreover, all individuals offer labor and capital services to firms by taking the net-of-tax factor prices, w s,t and r s,t as given. Firms, which are identical to each other, own a constant return to scale technology F satisfying the Inada conditions and which transforms the factors into productionconsumption units. Finally, the government can finance an exogenous stream of public expenditure G t , by issuing internal debt B t and by raising proportional taxes both on interests, wages and inheritance, referred to as τ 
Private agents
Agents' preferences can be represented by the following instantaneous utility function:
where β is the intertemporal discount rate, c 1 s,t , c 2 s,t+1 and l s,t are consumption in the first (young) and second (old) period of life and labor supply, respectively, of the individual born in period t and belonging to the dynasty started in period s. Such a utility function is strictly increasing in consumption and decreasing in labor, strictly concave, and satisfies the standard Inada conditions. Since we assume that individuals care about the well being of their children, and defining γ > 0 the "degree of altruism" of parents towards descendants, agents maximize the following utility function:
where δ = γβ (1 + n), x s,t the amount of the inheritance received by an individual born in period t, while r s,t+1 = r t+1 1 − τ k s,t+1 and w s,t = w t 1 − τ l s,t
are the net-of-tax factor prices. The FOCs of this problem imply:
where the expression U j is the partial derivative of the utility function with respect to argument j = c
, l t and p s,t is the shadow price of wealth. These conditions yield:
Firms
Under the assumption of perfect competition, in each period firms, supposed to be identical, hire capital, K, and labor, L, services according to their market prices (gross of taxes) and in order to maximize current period profits. This means that, for each firm i:
Note that capital is assumed to enter the production process with a one period lag.
Assuming a CRS technology for each firm i, the profit maximization conditions can be expressed, for the economy as a whole, in per worker terms, as:
where
of the young belonging to dynasty s in the whole young population in period t.
The government and market clearing conditions
The government is assumed to finance an amount of exogenous public expenditure by levying taxes on inheritance, capital and labor income and by issuing debt. In order to rule out the problem of time inconsistency, we suppose that the government has access to a commitment technology that ties it to the announced path of distortionary tax rates whenever the possibility of lump sum taxation arises 5 . The only constraints on the possibility of debt issuing are the usual no-Ponzi game condition and the initial condition B 0 = B. Thus, one obtains the usual equation for the dynamics of aggregate debt:
, which can also be written, in per worker terms, as:
Finally, the market clearing condition implies that, at each date, the sum of capital and debt equals aggregate private wealth in per worker terms (a t ), that is:
3 The Ramsey problem
Since we adopt the primal approach to the Ramsey (1927) problem, a key point is restricting the set of solutions to those allocations that can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium 6 . Thus, in this paragraph we define a competitive equilibrium and the constraints that must be imposed on the policymaker problem, in order to achieve such a competitive outcome.
The first constraint is the so-called "implementability constraint", i.e. the individual budget constraint with prices substituted for by the FOC's of the individual maximization problem (for the derivation see Appendix A.1):
which is referred to as the "implementability constraint". As for the second constraint, summing eq. (2) over population to get aggregate wealth, subtracting eq. (10) and exploiting the market clearing condition, we get, in per worker terms:
where c Such expression is usually referred to as the "feasibility constraint" (see Appendix A.2 for a formal derivation).
We can now give the following definition:
Such allocations are often referred to as "implementable".
In the light of the definition given above, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 An allocation is a competitive equilibrium if and only if it satisfies implementability and feasibility 7 .
Solution
Suppose that the policy is introduced at the end of period 0. In order to analyze the policymaker's problem, we introduce the following auxiliary function:
.
The problem can thus be written as follows:
where λ s is the multiplier associated to the implementability constraint (and usually interpreted as the deadweight loss of distortionary taxation), µ i s,t is the weight that the government attaches to individuals belonging to dynasty 7 The first part of the proposition is true by construction. The proof of the reverse (any allocation satisfying implementability and feasibility is a competitive equilibrium) follows a standard procedure and is available from the authors upon request. 
where H c 1
, which is usually referred to as the "general equilibrium elasticity" of (first period) consumption, H , the "general equilibrium elasticity" of (second period) consumption, and φ t is the multiplier associated to the feasibility constraint. Reiterating eq. (15) one period forward and dividing it by eq. (16), we get:
and, by exploiting eqs. (6), (8') and (17) and by reckoning that 
8 We omit the government budget constraint since, by Walras' law, it is satisfied if the implementability and feasibility constraints hold. Note that µ would not hold for all s. 9 Farhi and Werning (2005) obtain a time varying social discount rate by assuming that the government values the welfare of future generations directly. 10 We omit the solution for l s,t for the sake of brevity.
which provides the implicit expression for the optimal capital income tax 11 . By obtaining the FOC for c 1 s,t+1 and dividing it by eq. (16), we get:
, which yields:
The implicit expression of the overall tax hitting savings for bequest is:
Discussion of the results
Eqs. (18) and (19) show that there are two forces driving taxation as a whole: the first one depends on the evolution of the general equilibrium elasticity of consumption, the second one stems from the evolution of the social weights.
In particular, as far as capital income taxation is concerned, the first force arises from the difference between the general equilibrium elasticity of consumption in the first (H c 1 s,t ) and in the second period of life (H c 2 s,t+1 ); the second reason for nonzero capital income taxation is due to the difference in the weights assigned by the government in the first (µ The first factor has been widely discussed in the literature. As for capital income taxation, H c 1
obtains, for example, if one assumes 11 Note that we do not have any condition ensuring that the tax rate will be in the (0, 1) interval, while it is possible that such a rate keeps sticking at the upper limit for a (finite) period of time since the introduction of the policy. However, in the rest of the work we maintain the assumption of interiority of the equilibrium tax rates for t > 0.
that the utility function is homothetic in consumption and (weakly) separable in consumption and leisure. Otherwise, there is a force leading to taxing/subsidizing future consumption if consumption demand is getting more/less inelastic, respectively. Moreover, this factor marks the difference between the ILRA and the OLG-LC models as for the steady state result: in fact, in OLG ones, differently from the ILRA framework, H c can vary with age even at the steady state. However, as shown in eq. (18) and eq. (19), even in the absence of a life cycle, in the present model the nonzero tax rule can still apply, because of the presence of a second factor. The same considerations apply as for the inheritance tax. Thus, the second force driving taxation can be isolated by supposing H c 1
= H c 12 . Then, eq. (18) becomes:
and eq. (19) becomes:
As for the choice of the social weights, we can consider some exemplifying cases.
1) µ = 0. Since the weights assigned to individuals do not vary during their life and equal those assigned to their own children, there is no welfare gain in distorting individual choices.
2) µ population is lower than their parents' one; as a consequence, the government discriminates in favor of an individual's own consumption and against descendants' one.
The weight is assigned by the government to the dynasty, so that the parents' weight equals their children's one; however, differently from case 1), the dynasty's weight varies through time; in this case the capital income tax is different from zero. In particular, let us suppose, in application of the Benthamite approach, that the social weight of each dynasty is equal to its actual demographic weight within the population, i.e. µ s,t = Ds,t Nt
. The relative size of each dynasty is decreasing through time, so that
and, hence, the tax rate is positive 13 .
In other words, the government values future consumption more than the dynasty does and consequently uses the capital income tax to correct its consumption path. The inheritance tax is instead zero: since µ . The weight assigned in the first period of life is different from that assigned in the second period of life and from that assigned to one's heirs. In particular, suppose that µ
. Since the demographic weight is higher when young than when old, from eq. (21) we get that capital income is taxed; and, since the weight assigned to parents is lower than their children's one, estate is subsidized ( = (1 + α)). However, this subsidy does not completely outweigh the burden of interest income taxation, so that saving for bequeathing, though being discriminated against with respect to own present consumption, is favored over own future consumption (see eq. (20)
The government assigns a constant weight to the young in each period, equal to their share within the population (µ
), and a constant weight to the old, equal to their share within the population (µ ). Again, the capital income tax is positive, since consumption of the young is weighted more heavily than consumption of the old, given the higher demographic weight of the former with respect to the latter ( = H c ). Note that in all cases the rationale for taxation derives from Pigouvian arguments. In fact, the results would apply even if lump sum taxes were available, i.e. for λ = 0. In fact, allowing the social weight to vary with time and age turns out to be equivalent to assuming a constant intergenerational discount rate and a social intertemporal discount rate that differs from the individual one. Thus, varying dynasty's weights lead the government to correct private accumulation of capital.
Conclusions
Analyzing the inheritance tax within the optimal taxation framework and in a parallel to the capital income tax produces the following results for an economy characterized by OLG and disconnection originating from migration.
First, in line with the traditional analysis, scope for a differential treatment of consumption in different life periods (capital income tax) and of own future and descendants' consumption (inheritance tax) arises if the general equilibrium elasticity of consumption varies between life periods and between generations, respectively. Second, we find that an independent role is played by the weight attached to the individual utility functions by the government within the social welfare function. If these weights correspond to the actual demographic weights, the disconnection brought in by migration is the underlying reason for a nonzero optimal tax.
In all cases presented in this work the rationale for taxation can be reconducted to Pigouvian correction.
Derivation of the feasibility constraint
To derive the feasibility constraint, first aggregate eq. (2) = A t−1 , we can rewrite eq. (24) as follows A t = (1 + r t )A t−1 + w t L t − C Finally, by subtracting eq. (10) and exploiting the market clearing condition we obtain K t = (1 + r t )K t−1 + w t L t − C 
